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POOLS AND STREAMS: A THEORY OF DYNAMIC,
PRACTICE-BASED AWARENESS CREATION IN MEDIATED
COMMUNICATION
Abstract
In face-to-face contexts, information about the activities, context, emotions, etc. of
others is typically available and often taken for granted. In mediated settings, this
awareness information must be actively signaled by technology or users. In this
conceptual paper, we offer a theory of the dynamic creation of awareness in
mediated settings using a metaphor of pools fed by streams of communication.
Pools of awareness are held within users and gradually fill via signals from
others. Users desire different pools to be filled before others and direct the
streams of interaction to feed those pools first. Furthermore, the desired pools are
context and media dependent, but presence, identity, and activity appear to be
fundamental to mediated communication: fed early and taken for granted later.
Finally, pools drain if not actively replenished, and fundamental pools must be
refilled when a new encounter begins. We formulate theoretical propositions
according to our line of reasoning and discuss implications of our proposed
theory for mediated communication researchers and practitioners.
Keywords: awareness, mediated communication, presence, theory building

Introduction
People increasingly work and live in distributed contexts, where they and those with whom they
interact do not share a common physical environment (Leinonen et al., 2005, Mark, 2002). When
working remotely and using meditated communication, information about others, their activities,
context, emotions etc. is lost when compared with traditional face-to-face contexts (Scupelli et
al., 2005). While awareness of others and their activities is relatively easy to maintain or even
taken for granted in traditional co-located, face-to-face contexts (Gutwin and Greenberg, 2002),
lack of awareness is believed to create the coordination problems typically seen in distributed
work, such as inter-group conflicts (Rennecker, 2005).
Research and design practices in computer-supported cooperative work (CSCW) and humancomputer interaction (HCI) propose that collaboration is enhanced when systems communicate
awareness information about the presence and activities of the others in the shared workspace
1
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(Gross et al., 2005, Gutwin and Greenberg, 2002). Thus, the dominant view in the literature
favors a technology-centered viewpoint, which typically approaches development with a list of
suggested awareness features that should be incorporated into systems to foster collaboration
(Gutwin and Greenberg, 2002). According to this notion, awareness via mediated
communication is provided by technology; the mediating technology either provides a particular
form of awareness about the other or it does not.
In contrast with this view, more recent observations suggest that users of collaboration systems
often manipulate the features of mediated communication systems to create awareness in ways
that were not predicted by the designers (Frößler, 2006, Riemer et al., 2007). Thus, we adopt a
practice-based perspective on awareness creation and set out to explore a dynamic notion of
awareness creation, arguing that awareness is not a dichotomous state and is not created by
technology. As we will argue, the predominant technology-centric view of awareness fails to
appreciate the role of human actors in appropriating technologies and in creatively inventing new
ways of communicating that facilitate awareness creation, even in settings where mediating
technologies are not targeted at creating awareness. In contrast with the technology-centric view,
a practice-based perspective is able to account for the variety of ways in which awareness is
created by people in social contexts.
We propose a theory that captures the dynamic notion of awareness and moves beyond a
technology-centric view in that it treats awareness as a product of communicative practices that
are adapted to technology. To facilitate our discussion, we introduce the metaphor of awareness
as pools filled gradually by directing streams of communication. Under this dynamic notion,
users of mediated communication create and shape signals (the streams) to feed pools of
awareness within themselves and others. Furthermore, all aspects of awareness are not desired
simultaneously; rather, users have needs for different aspects of awareness, and these needs
evolve as other awareness needs are satisfied. The pools and streams metaphor is a means to
organize mediated communication technology design and user-based adaptations to mediating
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technology into a cohesive framework that accounts for the evolution of needs and the ability of
users to adapt technology to fulfill those needs. Our theory aims to (1) re-conceptualize the
nature of awareness, (2) explain the mechanisms of awareness creation (as part of social
practices) and (3) propose a set of fundamental awareness needs.
Adopting a human-centered, practice-based view of awareness enables us to understand how and
why awareness emerges through communication. Using our framework, tool designers and
researchers can recognize the potential for awareness needs to evolve, while explicitly
accounting for a user’s desire to direct interaction among various aspects of awareness according
to their needs and their perceptions of the needs of others. Our framework also appreciates the
role of the user in adapting, shaping and appropriating technology and their ability to direct
technology to flexibly fulfill their changing awareness needs. Moreover, it widens the view from
a design and management standpoint by suggesting a more holistic exploration of the creation of
awareness in social contexts. Rather than concentrating on the development of new awareness
technology, our framework shifts the focus to selecting and using technology that flexibly
supports the emergence of awareness creation practices. Awareness creation in this respect is
treated not only as a design problem, but also as a technology adoption and management issue.
We begin with a review of the predominant view of awareness as being technology-centric and
contrast it with the emerging practice-based view of awareness creation that forms the basis of
our theory. Next, we offer a thought experiment in which we envision a situation in which no
awareness of others exists and illustrate how fundamental needs for awareness shape mediated
communication. Then, we introduce the body of our theory: a dynamic model of awareness
creation in which awareness is conceived of as being held in pools, which are fed by interaction
streams directed by users. We formulate a set of propositions to capture the essence of our
theory. We close the paper with a discussion of implications for IS researchers and practitioners.
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Conceptualization of awareness in the literature
Awareness is generally seen as “an understanding of the activities of others, which provides a
context for your own activity” (Dourish and Bellotti, 1992, 107); it “involves knowing who is
‘around’, what activities are occurring, who is talking with whom; it provides a view of one
another in the daily work environments” (Dourish and Bly, 1992, 541). Researchers in computersupported cooperative work (CSCW) and the Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) have become
particularly interested in the concept of awareness and its creation through the use of technology,
proposing that collaboration is enhanced when the corresponding systems communicate
awareness information about the presence and activities of the others in the shared workspace,
and providing designers with a list of suggested awareness features that should be incorporated
into systems to foster collaboration (Gross et al., 2005, Gutwin and Greenberg, 2002).

Awareness is the result of technology
As noted earlier, the creation of awareness is treated in the CSCW and HCI literature as a design
problem mastered through a development process that aims to enable certain types of awareness
by means of specific technological features (e.g. Gutwin et al., 1996, Koch, 2005). In doing so,
different types of awareness are typically distinguished according to the reference object to
which the awareness is directed - for example, task-related awareness is in relation to the
activities of people, or social awareness is in relation to emotional states of others (Gross et al.,
2005, Robertson, 2002). Awareness as such is seen as provided by technology; specialized
awareness applications are developed to address awareness problems (Boyer et al., 1998,
Ljungstrand and Segerstad, 2000); IT artifacts provide certain awareness functions (Scupelli et
al., 2005) or features (Borning and Travers, 1991); they gather and provide awareness
information (Jang et al., 2000) in order to promote (Rennecker, 2005) or support awareness in
collaborative work (Gutwin and Greenberg, 1996). Research projects in this tradition generally
aim at creating virtual environments that simulate the real world and its ways of creating
awareness through inscription in technology (e.g. Borning and Travers, 1991, Boyer et al., 1998,
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Gutwin and Greenberg, 1996). Consequently, the dominant view of awareness is a technologybased view, which treats awareness as a product (or even a feature) of technology.

Awareness is created instantly
By thinking of it as a product of technology, awareness is consequently seen as being created
instantly. For example, in the context of Instant Messaging (IM), researchers have stressed the
importance of what is called the presence awareness capability (Cameron and Webster, 2005).
This feature typically functions such that an icon signals the status of a user, showing that the
user’s computer system is online (Carmona, 2008); in essence, the application has registered
with the IM server (Luo and Liao, 2008). Awareness of presence via IM is thus created instantly
by way of deriving, transporting and revealing the necessary information (i.e., only delayed
because of the time required to start the application and connect to the status server); some
authors have even argued that tools such as IM “support awareness of presence in real-time”
(Ljungstrand and Segerstad, 2000, 22).

Awareness is a state
It can be inferred from the above that awareness in the literature is mainly treated as a state;
when a particular aspect of awareness is provided, that aspect is fully fashioned in that instant.
Hence, under this notion awareness of status via IM is complete: visualized for the user and
others with different icons and/or colors (Herbsleb et al., 2002). By thinking of it as a state,
awareness is also seen as being dichotomous; in essence, a user is either not aware or aware of a
particular aspect of their mediated environment. Essentially, the argument is that awareness is
created in systems by capturing information and presenting it to users (Gutwin and Greenberg,
1996). Similarly, awareness features are offered to users of other IT artifacts; in social
networking sites by listing the status and profile changes of their friends, to players in online
multiplayer games by providing otherwise hidden information about another player’s interactions
with the gaming application (Moore et al., 2007), and to visitors in a museum by notifying them
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when others are looking at or virtually accessing information about the exhibit they are viewing
(Gross and Specht, 2001).
In summary, the dominant view in the existing literature is to treat awareness as a property of
technology, in essence, that awareness is something to be built into or that is instantly created by
the technology. It is conceptualized as a state and it is implied that awareness as a state can be
complete. In the following we will challenge this technology-centric notion of awareness and
pave the way for a theory that treats awareness creation as a dynamic process embedded in social
practice.

Toward a theory of dynamic, practice-based awareness creation
While CMC and HCI research has focused on different objects and types of awareness, discussed
the need for and implications of awareness, and explored to a great extent the design of
technologies to produce awareness, relatively little is known about how awareness emerges in
mediated communication as the result of communication practices (Riemer et al., 2007). Only a
few recent papers have argued for a dynamic notion of awareness as being based on the
communicative practices of users instead of simply being created by technology (Heath et al.,
2002, Riemer et al., 2007, Schmidt, 2002). However, this dynamic notion was neither
conceptualized nor theorized further.
Riemer et al. (2007) explored awareness creation in five cases in which the same IT artifact was
used for communication and awareness creation purposes. The authors found a surprising variety
across the cases of both the types of awareness and the ways in which awareness was created.
They argue that awareness, as created in context, goes “way beyond what can be expected from
the tool and its ‘built in’ awareness capabilities.” (Riemer et al., 2007, p. 1). Thus, we suggest
that awareness and its creation are not adequately explained by the existing conceptualization of
awareness. Other scholars have similarly argued that awareness is a learned, embodied, skilful
action, which is why awareness is neither the “product of passively acquired ‘information’”
(Schmidt, 2002, 292), nor is it a property of technology (Robertson, 2002). Technology is
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therefore subject to interpretation and appropriation, and awareness can only be achieved by the
skillful activities of participants in a shared environment who draw upon technology resources in
the creation of awareness (Riemer et al., 2007).
While a practice notion has been proposed, to our knowledge no work exists that discusses in a
systematic and coherent way the production of awareness as a dynamic process with awareness
being something that is built gradually by users and which can also vanish over time. In the next
sections, we clarify our motivation for choosing a practice-based view of awareness creation and
introduce the idea that awareness needs in mediated communication evolve over time.

Awareness is created through social practice
As noted earlier, the practice notion treats awareness as emerging from communication practices
(i.e., the manipulation of technology) rather than as a property of technology. Those that favor
this more human-centered, practice-based view of technology note that the users of
communication and collaboration systems often use the technological features in quite
unexpected ways (i.e., in ways not predicted by the designers) (DeSanctis and Poole, 1994,
Huysman et al., 2003, Oemig and Gross, 2007). The practice-based approach to awareness
appreciates the active role of humans and their shared communication practices in the creation of
awareness (Riemer et al., 2007). This notion does not neglect or even reject technology’s
influence on awareness creation: we take a position that acknowledges the duality of design and
practice in the use of collaboration technology – designers create the features that users use to
create awareness. Thus, the process of creating and communicating awareness information
among users is shaped by the limitations of a particular technology platform, but users can adapt
their communication and increase awareness within the bounds of technical limitations by
shaping their behavior (cf., Walther, 1992).
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A dynamic notion of awareness creation
Furthermore, we conceptualize awareness as something within users that may build up slowly
rather than being instantly created and that needs maintenance rather than being simply fulfilled.
Thus, we introduce a dynamic, evolving notion of awareness – the formation of different aspects
of awareness over time by interactants. We will argue that different aspects of awareness about
one’s environment do not develop at the same time; rather, certain aspects of awareness are
sought first and, once attained, lead one to seek awareness about other aspects. In doing so, we
will also move away from a static and general classification of awareness types and suggest that
awareness needs are highly context- and interactant-dependent: the types of awareness that are
needed and thus attended to by interactants vary by context and individual, and those needs
evolve over time.
Consequently, we suggest that awareness in mediated environments (1) is based on, or more
precisely, emerges from social practice, and thus does not emerge solely from, nor is it entirely
limited by technology; (2) is not instantly created, but develops gradually, often slowly, through
the practices of users; and (3) that the salient objects of awareness are not pre-specified and
constant within a given context, rather the salience of objects is dynamic and changes according
to the needs of users.

Theory development
In the following we propose a theory for explaining awareness and its creation in social
encounters. Following the taxonomy proposed by Gregor (2006) our theory qualifies as a type II
theory, a theory that aims at explaining how and why things are. In that respect, our theory aims
at making three contributions to further our understanding of awareness: (1) explaining the
nature of awareness (how should awareness be conceptualized?), (2) explaining the mechanisms
of awareness creation (how is awareness created?), and (3) introducing the idea of fundamental
types of awareness and the otherwise situation-dependent nature of awareness needs (why is
awareness needed in distributed social encounters?). In order to do so, we will introduce the
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pools and streams metaphor as a means for capturing the dynamic nature of awareness and
present a set of propositions that further clarify the understanding of awareness creation.
While our theory aims at explaining awareness and the mechanisms that facilitate its creation, it
does not aim at making generalizable predictions that can be readily tested in empirical research
(type IV theory). This is partly due to the context-dependent nature of the types of awareness
needed (i.e., we propose that awareness needs to vary in specific social contexts). However, in
the discussion section. we will briefly discuss ways of operationalizing our theory and deriving
hypotheses about awareness needs in specific application contexts. .
We begin with a thought experiment, which envisions a situation where virtually no awareness
of others exists, and illustrate how different aspects of awareness are created by way of
communication and how awareness of others gradually develops over time. As such, the thought
experiment serves two purposes. Firstly, it introduces the most fundamental types of awareness,
which we suggest are universal and needed independent of context. Secondly, it provides a first
illustration of the dynamic view of awareness creation, in which awareness is conceived of as
being held in pools that are fed by streams of information that are directed by users. The main
body of the theory is then presented afterwards as a set of propositions clarifying in detail the
nature of awareness and the mechanisms of awareness creation. We conclude with implications
for research and practice.

Fundamental awareness needs in distributed communication
The following thought experiment introduces the most fundamental types of awareness by
illustrating a situation in which no awareness exists at the beginning of a social encounter. We
acknowledge that this situation is to a certain extent a simplification, but we believe that a
thought experiment allows us to clarify the basic mechanisms and underlying concepts of
awareness creation in a mediated communication context.
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Thought experiment
Imagine a situation in which an experimenter leads a person to a computer terminal. No other
people are present, but on the computer a chat program is running (Figure 1). There is nothing on
the screen other than the window, only a flashing cursor. What will the person do? There is no
indication that another person or persons is at “the other end” and will respond to messages, only
the implicit suggestion that something might happen if he/she enters something, which comes
from his/her prior experience with “experimenters,” “computer terminals,” and “chat programs.”
a Te o e
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Figure 1: Transcript of Thought Experiment Chat

Once seated, the person types “Hi” and presses enter. His/her “Hi” then appears on the upper part
of the chat screen. A short time later, “Hi. Who is this?” also appears on the upper part of the
screen. He/she types “This is Pat. Who are you?” and presses enter. A short time later, “Oh, this
is Jordan” appears. From here, a conversation can unfold: it might concern a recent party that
each of them attended, a discussion of current political issues, or anything else that they might
wish to talk about.
This situation illustrated in our thought experiment is different from most communication in that
there were relatively few assumptions that were made by the participant up front. Initially, there
is little sense that another person will receive and respond to his/her messages. After the first
entry, he/she can see that the computer system is at least processing his/her messages, but still
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must assume that there is the potential for another person to receive and respond to his/her
messages. After the first reply is received, he/she can only be sure that at least one other is
receiving their message. Eventually, he/she learns the name of the person with which he/she is
communicating. Over a longer conversation, he/she might learn the likes/dislikes of the person,
aspects of the physical environment in which the other is located, etc.
Our aim in portraying this thought experiment is to offer the notion that when people interact via
mediated communication (computer, telephone, teletype, or otherwise), there is a minimum
amount of awareness that must exist within an individual before interaction will occur.
Furthermore, once this minimal level of awareness is achieved, each person will desire to meet
certain additional information needs about the others (cf., Berger and Calabrese, 1975). These
information needs are filled by awareness, and we suggest that some needs are more fundamental
than others.

Presence
In our thought experiment, and in any mediated communication, the minimum need of a person
seems to be a belief that another might receive and respond to their messages, in essence, to
answer the question “Anybody there?” (Jarvenpaa and Leidner, 1999, 9 and 16). As interaction
proceeds, this awareness can build so that one has a sense that another will quite assuredly
respond within a few moments, and, given sufficient time and message exchanges, build to the
point where one has a feeling that another is attending to the interaction in much the same way
that one would sense it when face-to-face (i.e., propinquity) (Walther, 1992). It is important to
clarify at this point that our notion of presence so far refers to the presence in a virtual space.
Hence, it could also be termed ‘virtual presence’ to distinguish it from the bodily presence of
someone in the ‘real’ world. Giddens (1984) denotes with presence a ‘being there’ (i.e. Dasein)
of someone; a bodily existence, which refers to the being in a physical location or context,
engaged in and/or available for communication. But Giddens also recognizes that “although the
‘full conditions of co-presence’ exist only in unmediated contact between those who are
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physically present, mediated contacts that permit some of the intimacies of co-presence are made
possible in the modern era by electronic communication” (Giddens, 1984, 88). Hence, in
mediated communication, awareness of the other’s presence can extend to a degree that a
sensation of co-presence occurs (Riemer et al., 2007).
In a mediated context, one also has to be physically present in that one must be located near and
capable of manipulating a mediating technology (Riemer et al., 2007). However, others do not
necessarily need an awareness of one’s physical location, although this may emerge with more
messages. Consequently, in mediated communication, awareness of the presence of others can
range from the most basic sense that “someone is out there” (i.e., Gegenwart) to a point where
one also gains an understanding of the bodily presence and context of others in the real world
(e.g. the other is sitting at a desk in an office near a phone) and which might lead to a sensation
of nearness or co-presence.
Thus, we suggest that the most fundamental need in mediated communication is awareness that
another is present. In our thought experiment, the desire for minimal presence awareness is
communicated in the first message: “Hi,” and is filled with the response “Hi. Who is this?” After
awareness of another’s presence has been established (i.e., he/she knows that someone else is
present in the virtual environment), we suggest, although they may be attended to later, two other
forms of awareness are equally important to interaction via mediated communication.

Activity
Activity refers to the degree to which one is aware that something has happened, is happening, or
is likely to happen in the shared virtual space (Gross et al., 2005, Gutwin and Greenberg, 2002,
Steinfield et al., 1999). Awareness of activity likewise ranges, from a sense that something might
happen to knowledge of what has happened, perhaps eventually reaching the point where one
may feel that he/she understands why things happened and has a sense of what will happen next.
Activity awareness is fundamental in that one could not really be considered interacting in the
shared space if one could not observe the messages and activities of another, and similarly, if one
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did not feel that one’s actions were being observed by others. Activity awareness is provided as
the mediating technology communicates the messages and/or behavior of others in the shared
space. In our thought experiment, activity awareness minimally arises as the first “Hi” appears in
the upper section of the chat window, and rises further when the response “Hi. Who is this?”
appears.

Identity
Identity refers to the degree to which one is aware that others in the mediated space are distinct
individuals (Gross and Specht, 2001, Gutwin and Greenberg, 2002). Identity awareness ranges
from a sense of the quantity of others that are present (i.e., feeling that one or several others are
present) to a feeling that one can distinguish among distinct others (i.e., Unterscheidbarkeit),
perhaps eventually reaching the point where one may feel that he/she can precisely quantify the
number and personally identify the others in the shared space. This awareness is increased as one
observes that distinct others are acting in the shared space. We emphasize that the identity
awareness need may not necessarily require knowing the given name of the others (a.k.a.
organizational identity); rather the initial need may simply be a desire to sense the others present
as individuals rather than being an amorphous mass of “others”. A desire to know, and
eventually knowledge of given names arising later in an interaction exemplifies our notion that
awareness can vary over time. In our thought experiment, identity awareness arises as the person
begins to feel that one other person is present in the mediated space. This happens as the
comments of the other appear, and the apparent continuity of the comments: in the reply “Hi.
Who is this?”, the “Who is this?” is assumed to indicate that another person has received the first
message and is responding. With “Oh. This is Jordan”, the “Oh” is assumed to be a reply to the
prior comment, and increases awareness that only one other person is present. Messages about
likes/dislikes, previous experiences, etc. further enhance the identity of the other.
We suggest that identity awareness is distinct from activity awareness in that it is possible for
one to observe and understand the activities in a mediated space without needing to have a clear
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idea of which entity had performed which activity. Thus, the activity and comments of others can
potentially be observed and responded to without necessarily needing to know the identity of the
others interacting in the shared space (i.e. it is possible to interact with an undefined number of
‘others’). Similarly, there may be features of the mediating technology that communicate the
identity of those present in the mediated space without requiring any contributions by them. This
distinction between activity and identity awareness facilitates the ideal of being able to interact
anonymously via mediated communication without fear that others will be able to identify, and
thus evaluate one’s comments. However, we note that identity awareness has been shown to
emerge in anonymous situations with user practices or given enough activity in the shared space
(cf., Hayne et al., 2003, McLeod, 2000, Walther, 1992), suggesting that users will eventually
direct themselves to linking activities to a particular persona.

Role of Awareness in Reducing Uncertainty
In all interaction, each person’s action “is determined by his assumption of the action of the
others” (Mead, 1934, 154). In face-to-face interaction and via familiar communication media,
individuals shape their interaction and interpretation of the actions of others in the context of
their prior experience with a similar context, “taking the role of the other … going through
certain rites which are the representation of what these individuals are supposed to be doing”
(Mead, 1934, 153). The fundamental driver of behavior in the initial stages of face-to-face
interaction is a need to reduce uncertainty (Berger and Calabrese, 1975). We suggest that in a
less familiar mediated context (e.g., our thought experiment), uncertainty is increased even
further and extends into other areas because much of the contextual awareness that would be
available to interactants in face-to-face communication cannot be as easily assumed, even when
displayed directly by the technology. Thus, we propose that interactants reduce the uncertainty
that arises in mediated communication by actively signaling their presence, identity, and
activities to others, and that these and other aspects of awareness are needed in order to create the
“generalized other”, which forms the fundamental basis for interaction (cf., Mead, 1934).
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In mediated communication, information about others is limited when compared with face-toface interactions. In our thought experiment, the person sitting in front of the computer may be
unsure about very fundamental things that would be taken for granted when speaking face-toface or when using a familiar mediated communication with a familiar other. We recognize that
individuals do indeed wish to reduce uncertainty in the initial stages of interaction, and our
thought experiment is prototypical of an initial interaction involving strangers (Berger and
Calabrese, 1975); however, reflecting the need to consider the other when interacting, we suggest
that one has a particular set of fundamental notions about others for which uncertainty needs to
be reduced. In mediated communication, these include the aspects of awareness we noted earlier:
whether others are present, whether activity will take place, and how to distinguish among the
others. We further suggest that these notions about others accumulate as the signals are
exchanged via the communication technology. In the following section, we introduce our
conceptualization of the creation and maintenance of awareness through user actions using the
metaphor of pools that are filled by streams of communication: we describe as pools the different
aspects of awareness that are gradually filled as user actions direct streams of signals to create
awareness (i.e., by manipulating the features of the communication technology). The pools and
streams metaphor also frames our notion of the sequential emergence of different types of
awareness in the course of communication as illustrated in our thought experiment.

A Theory of Awareness: Pools and Streams
When a person is immersed in an unfamiliar context with little empirical information about their
surroundings (e.g., the man waking up in darkness in The Pit and the Pendulum (Poe, 2003), the
interactants in our thought experiment), their awareness of everything emerges slowly and builds
upon very basic components: whether there are other objects (or people) in the space, what are
the dimensions of the space, where are the other objects in the space, what are the characteristics
of the objects in the space. We suggest that these different aspects of the environment about
which one is or desires to be aware should be thought of as separate pools of awareness.
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Moreover, we propose that awareness is formed from streams of information, which fills the
pools. The streams are directed by the practices of the interactants, as when a user provides a
specific component of awareness (i.e. filling a particular pool). In the earlier thought experiment,
the reply “This is Pat” represents a stream directed to identity. Streams can also be
technologically directed, as when a chat room attaches a first name or other identifier
automatically to every comment. In the following, we first elaborate on the notion of the pools,
before discussing the mechanism for filling the pools, which is via streams that are directed by
the communication practices of users. As we elaborate and discuss the implications of pools and
streams of awareness, we will formulate a set of propositions that explain the key aspects of our
awareness understanding.

Pools of awareness
We propose that the various types of awareness be conceived of as pools that are filled over time
as interactants direct streams of signaling information. In our thought experiment, the presence
pool fills as the other sends messages: at first, one can only be sure that another responded to the
first message; over time, he/she will begin to feel that the other will remain present and not
unexpectedly stop responding. The presence pool can continue to fill, meaning the awareness of
the other’s presence might extend to a more profound understanding of the other person’s bodily
context. Hence, we argue that awareness of others emerges as a pool starts filling (e.g. in our
thought experiment the initial exchange might be seen as the ‘first drop’ into the pool); as
interaction proceeds the pool then continues to fill over time, which can lead to a more profound
level of awareness. Consequently, the notion of a pool exemplifies how there can be relative
levels of awareness over the course of an interaction. For example, one can initially have a sense
that there are some people present in a chat room, then, after interacting for a time, one might
have a sense that there are four different people.
In contrast to the technology-centered view, we also emphasize that interface elements that are
designed to convey awareness do not inevitably lead to a full pool. As noted earlier, an IM
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interface typically shows a list of contacts by screen name, along with their status: online, busy,
away, or offline. However, while a status icon that shows “online” may heighten awareness of
the others’ presence, the presence awareness pool is not completely filled through this kind of
information. As examples, (1) the person may have stepped away from their computer without
updating their status, (2) someone else might be using that person’s computer, and (3) the person
might be working on another task not actually available for interaction. Similarly, a chat room’s
list of present members does not necessarily ensure that all of the others are attending to the
conversation, and although one might see that another is in front of their computer when video
conferencing, one may not be completely sure that he/she is attending to the conversation until
he/she speaks.
Proposition 1: Awareness develops gradually over time. In essence, awareness behaves
like a pool that is filled by streams of interaction over the course of an encounter.
Taking the pools metaphor a step further, we also suggest that awareness declines over time
when signals from others stop. For example, one can have a clear sense that there were four
others present in a chat room at the time one left; however, awareness of who will be there two
hours later is less certain, and one may not have a sense that anyone will be present at all after
several months. Thus, we suggest that pools of awareness must be actively replenished because
they gradually drain over time. Similar draining effects are likely to occur via asynchronous
communication such as e-mail or web forums – when others do not respond to ones messages or
posts; one’s pool of awareness about their presence will decline.
Proposition 2: Awareness requires active maintenance or else it declines over time. In
essence, awareness pools drain over time.
Recognizing that each interactant might deal with the uncertainty in mediated communication
differently, we further suggest that these pools of awareness are within the interacting
individuals. Pools of awareness are not a group level phenomenon, meaning that there is not a
general store of awareness for a group; rather, the members of a group are likely to have different
levels in their pools, based on their own prior experiences and interpretation of the signals of
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others. The variability in pools within group members is exemplified when a new person joins
the interaction of several others. Those that have been engaged in the interaction might be aware
that three other people are present, while the new person may only have a sense that more than
one other is present.
Proposition 3: Awareness is an individual and not a group-level or workspace-level
construct. In essence, awareness pools are located within people.
Our first three propositions described the dynamic nature of awareness of being conceived as
pools within people that fill gradually and can drain over time. The following propositions
further clarify how pools (i.e., awareness needs) in individuals are linked to each other within
individuals and the others with whom they interact. Similar to theories of group development
(Tuckman and Jensen, 1977; Wheelan, 1994), we suggest that some types of awareness must at
least be attended to before an interactant using mediated communication will attend to others. As
elaborated on in detail in our thought experiment, the most fundamental component of awareness
in a mediated communication environment seems to be presence, or the feeling that others will
attend to one’s signals; this awareness is formed by signals provided by the application and/or by
others. Once one feels that others are present in the environment, other types of awareness will
be sought, the most basic of which are activity and identity. We propose that these three types of
awareness needs are universal across contexts.
Proposition 4: The fundamental types of awareness (i.e., pools) in mediated
communication are presence, identity and activity.
As a particular pool is filled to a certain extent, one can begin to take that aspect of awareness for
granted. For example, once one can take for granted that the other will remain present and not
unexpectedly stop responding, that store of presence awareness means that he/she can move on
to other matters (e.g., determining the identity of the person); not having to re-establish the
presence of the other before sending each message. Thus, we suggest that, depending on the
needs of the interactants, certain types of awareness will be prerequisites for others (Figure 2). In
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general, identity awareness will not be sought until there is at least a minimal sense of presence
awareness; likewise, activity awareness will not be sought without minimal presence awareness.
The different types of awareness accumulate (i.e. the different pools fill) as the interaction
proceeds, providing one with a store of information upon which to base later signals to others
(i.e., a sense of the generalized other). Hence, awareness in a communication encounter can be
thought of as a hierarchy of awareness pools, with lower level pools including aspects of
awareness such as roles, preferences, skills, emotional states, etc. The hierarchy of awareness
pools that was discussed in the thought experiment is shown graphically in Figure 2. We
emphasize that prerequisite pools, once filled, do not spill over to automatically fill other pools.
In Figure 2 we connect the pools using arrows. However, the arrows are there only to indicate
those pools that are prerequisites to others. We propose that later pools are dependent on prior
pools in that the prior pools will need to have a minimal level of awareness (i.e., a “first drop”)
before the later pool will be filled, but that the information used to fill the prior pool does not
“spill over” and fill the later pool. For example, a message that is accompanied by a photograph
and name can simultaneously convey identity and activity, but having identity information on
each message does not mean that identity information “spills over” from the identity pool into
other pools once it is filled, rather, identity will just be taken for granted (i.e., that aspect of
awareness in the stream will be taken for granted). Thus, the later pools are fed because the
interactants are choosing to direct their attention (i.e., their streams – see below) to another
matter once they feel the prerequisite pools have been adequately filled.
Proposition 5: In a mediated communication encounter, some aspects of awareness are
prerequisites of others. In essence, the pools take the form of a hierarchy.

Presence

Identity
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Figure 2: Pool Hierarchy in Thought Experiment

In order to further illustrate the hierarchy of pools, in the following sections we discuss examples
of awareness creation in consensus groups and task-oriented groups. An extended example of the
hierarchy of pools of awareness via mediated communication is a situation in which members of
a group are told to reach agreement on a jury award (Figure 3). When their comments are
completely anonymous, the group members apparently feel that they need to be able to
individually identify (differentiate between) the comments of other members, leading them to
insert identifiers into their comments (McLeod, 2000)1. Thus, in this situation, minimal
awareness of identity is needed to enable group members to become aware of the preferences of
other members. Awareness of the preferences within the group is needed before group members
determine the degree to which they will be influenced by others, which must occur before the
group can reach agreement (Haines et al. (2006) found less group influence when identifiers
were not used).

1

Similar behavior is observed in anonymous online forums.
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Figure 3: Pool Hierarchy in Agreement Group

However, in task-oriented groups, the hierarchy of awareness needs leads to a different goal,
with users focusing instead on becoming aware of the skills of specific others so that roles can be
effectively assigned (Goffman, 1961). For example, virtual team members apparently feel that
they need to know a person’s skill at accomplishing an information-processing task in order for
them to be assigned a particular role in the group (Haines and Scamell, 2003). Roles and
structures within a task-oriented group also evolve as group members become more aware of
each other, using their context-dependent set of pools (cf., Oemig and Gross, 2007). In a taskoriented group these pools seem to begin with awareness that others are present, an awareness of
their distinct identities, and awareness of the activities that are taking place. As these attain
minimal pools, group members appear to then wish to become aware of the degree to which one
possesses a particular skill and is dependable; then they can become aware that one can be
cognitively trusted to fulfill a role (McAllister, 1995). Taking this still further, before building
awareness about whether one is appropriately assigned to a role, group members might desire
pools of awareness about whether one is available and can be cognitively trusted (Figure 4).
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Figure 4: Pool Hierarchy in Task-Oriented Group

Comparing the pool hierarchies for agreement versus task-oriented groups illustrates the
potential for prerequisite pools to differ by context. We emphasize that there are many, many
more pools possible, even in these relatively simple contexts. Indeed, it is probably not possible
to identify all of the pools that might be desired by interactants, because as an encounter
proceeds, one might suddenly get the urge to become aware of something that is ostensibly
unrelated to the task at hand, but that might have relevance to a relationship (e.g., how many
children another has, or what they are doing the next weekend). The pool hierarchy may also be
extended as the encounter proceeds. For example, one group member may wait to build
awareness about whether another is appropriately assigned to a role in a task-oriented group until
after one had learned whether the other had a preference toward performing the role and whether
the activity itself had a purpose toward the groups’ goals, in addition to the pools noted earlier.
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Thus, we suggest that while providing lists of typical pools of awareness in various contexts is
certainly useful to technology designers, it should not be seen as an end in itself, because users
may have other matters to which they wish to attend.
Proposition 6: Awareness needs are highly context-dependent. In essence, the selection
of pools that need to be filled is different across contexts.
We have suggested that pools are not filled all at the same time; specifically, that some pools are
prerequisites for others and thus filled early in an encounter, while others are filled later in an
encounter. Drawing on this implicit notion of a hierarchy of pools, we further suggest that
higher-level pools are shallow in the sense that they are easier to fill, but also drain much faster
than lower-level pools. For example, while awareness of how many people are in a mediated
environment (e.g. a chat room) can be established quite quickly, awareness of another’s
preferences, political views, and/or organizational status takes much longer to be created.
However, being more profound (i.e., deeper), these aspects of awareness are also much more
stable. Hence, while awareness that is encounter-specific drains quickly, awareness that is
relationship-specific is much more lasting and can be drawn upon even after months of not
interacting. The latter (relationship-specific) information is relatively long-lived in mediated
communication when compared with the fundamental pools of presence, identity, and activity.
Such fundamental aspects need some replenishment at the initiation of each new encounter. We
offer two simple examples that illustrate the need to replenish fundamental awareness pools. (1)
One may have uncertainty about when another will be available to read and reply to an important
e-mail, and may request that the other reply immediately to indicate that it has been received. (2)
One may have uncertainty about whether another is available for a voice call via Skype, and may
request such information via an e-mail or a chat message (even if the other’s status flag shows
that they are online).
Proposition 7: Fundamental types of awareness are more encounter-dependent and are
developed quicker. In addition, the stores of more fundamental types of awareness also
decline much more rapidly than other types of awareness, which are of personal or
relationship information. In essence, higher-level pools in a hierarchy fill faster, but must
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be replenished with each encounter, while lower-level pools are filled much later, but
retain their levels for longer.
In this section we firstly proposed a dynamic conceptualization of awareness, which conceives
awareness as pools located within people that fill gradually over time and which also drain when
not being maintained. Three propositions explain the pool notion of awareness, while the next
four propositions elaborate on the relationships between pools: awareness needs (pools) in a
social encounter form a hierarchy of dependencies, with the actual selection of pools being
context-dependent, while three needs (presence, activity and identity) are seen as universal. Also,
higher-level pools in the hierarchy are encounter-dependent and shallow, in that they fill and
drain quickly, while lower-level pools are seen as relationship-dependent and deeper, in that they
take more time to fill, but will last longer. Having explained the nature of awareness and the
context-dependency of awareness needs, we will now turn to explaining the mechanisms of
awareness creation as captured in the streams notion.

Directing the Streams: A Practice-based notion of awareness creation
In contrast to the technology-centric view, we argue that it is the interactants in a specific
situation that create awareness through their communication and shared work practices, and that
awareness is not simply provided by technology. As such, awareness is the result of shared,
mutual practices of signaling and observing. People signal awareness information to others and
likewise perceive what others are signaling. We conceive of these signals, created by the
interactants, as streams of awareness information. Awareness emerges as people fill their pools
of awareness by drawing on the available streams (i.e., by observing the signals that are carried
by the technology).
Furthermore, we suggest that one’s interaction is guided by a view of the generalized other.
Hence, the signals one sends are determined by two considerations: one wishes to fill specific
awareness pools, and one recognizes that others wish to fill similar pools. Thus, awareness is
based on the concept of projection; as one engages in signaling, conveying certain aspects of
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awareness, one projects one’s own situation and awareness needs to the others in order to
determine the signals one sends to others. At the same time one expects to be similarly signaled
by others (i.e., reciprocity). Hence, the kinds of awareness streams that are created are dependent
on the ways in which interactants perceive each other.
Ultimately, signaling and observing can be seen as two sides of the same coin in the creation of
awareness; they form a duality with both concepts relying on each other, as the observing of
information and activities that are relevant for one person requires that information to be
displayed by others.
Proposition 8: Awareness results from mutual practices of signaling awareness
information and observing this information.
Proposition 8a: Awareness information is conveyed through social signaling
practices. In essence, the streams, which convey awareness information, are
initiated/created by interactants.
Proposition 8b: Awareness emerges when awareness information is observed and
used by interactants. In essence, the pools within interactants fill as a result of
capturing the awareness information flowing from the streams.
The streams metaphor is also important because it emphasizes that the signals that move among
interactants can be directed deliberately to fill certain pools. Considering that one has goals for
an interaction, these goals influence what he/she attends and what they wish to be attended to.
For example, consider the member of a group that is thrust into a chat room and told to
determine whether a course of action is ethical or unethical. First, he/she must be assured that
his/her comments will be attended to. This assurance might come externally (i.e., from a face-toface interaction) or when he/she sees the comments of another appear on their screen. Once the
presence of others has been determined, he/she will shape the interaction according to what
he/she feel is important and his/her perceptions of what others feel is important. Thus, the
streams may be directed toward personally identifying others, achieving an affective relationship
with others, or simply to aspects of their task. This understanding of interactants deliberately
directing the streams to fill certain pools complements the notion of the hierarchy of pools
(proposition 5) and the context-specificity of awareness needs (proposition 6).
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Proposition 9: Interactants deliberately attend to certain types of awareness before
others. In essence, awareness streams are directed by the interactants in both signaling
and observing in order to fill certain pools before others.
Awareness as portrayed so far is not a feature of technology, but the result of shared practices in
which the technology becomes embedded. “Essentially, defining awareness only in terms of
technical software features ignores the subtle ways in which groups are able to create awareness
through their shared practices of using technology.” (Riemer et al., 2007, 13) However,
technology plays an unquestionably vital role in the process of awareness creation by enabling
and also constraining social practices: while technology cannot per se produce awareness,
specific technological features enable (or constrain) the creation of awareness. Furthermore, such
features still have to be appropriated by interactants; meaning that signals ostensibly produced by
the technology are actually under the control of the interactants and may be observed in
unintended ways (e.g., the modification of IM screen names to display status information (Smale
and Greenberg, 2005). Hence, while awareness is created through practice the technology acts as
an enabler; communication technology is the medium that carries the streams of awareness
information and as such enables the practices to emerge.
Proposition 10: Technology plays a vital role in awareness creation as it acts as a
medium and enabler. In essence, the streams are carried by technology.
We also recognize that by shifting attention to a particular aspect of awareness as they interact,
participants in an interaction fill that particular pool at a faster rate than others. Hence, we argue
that streams have volume. This volume is to a considerable extent determined by the nature and
characteristics of the communication medium. Noting that a stream of communication has both
volume and particular content, increasing the overall volume of interaction (e.g., using voice
communication rather than text (Walther, 1992)), is likely to mean more rapidly accumulating
pools of awareness over a given time. This notion is consistent with theories such as social
presence theory (Short et al., 1976) or media richness theory (Daft and Lengel, 1984), which
suggest that technologies differ in terms of the kinds of signals they are capable of transmitting,
with some media providing richer or wider channels. We argue that richer channels are likely to
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convey multiple aspects of awareness, meaning that interactants can direct the streams of
awareness toward filling pools more rapidly or even multiple pools simultaneously. At the same
time, because mediated communication channels are often quite limited in the amount of
information that can be conveyed, interactants must choose what information to communicate,
and recognize that others are similarly able to choose.
Proposition 11: Interactants can influence the speed of awareness creation, especially by
selecting certain media over others. In essence, streams have volume (the rate with which
pools fill), which is limited by the characteristics of the medium.
Finally, with regard to practices of signaling and observing, two levels of engagement can be
distinguished: active and latent. Active signaling refers to the user deliberately conveying certain
information in order to fill a particular pool of awareness (i.e., feeding and directing a certain
stream). In our thought experiment, with the statement “This is Pat”, the user actively signals
identity. On the other hand, signaling can also be latent, meaning signals are often conveyed as a
by-product of other activities. For example, the pools reliability and skill might be filled as a byproduct of users behaving in a corresponding way during the course of the interaction. Rather
than having to actively communicate skill the respective signals are picked up by others as the
result of the user carrying out a task that requires a particular skill.
Furthermore, we recognize that awareness tools can help filling a particular pool even if the
participants do not focus their attention on that particular dimension. For example, instant
messaging tools provide status features in their interfaces for providing presence awareness;
providing additional information about presence that would ordinarily require an exchange of
signals (e.g., available, off line, do not disturb, etc.). This means one can initiate an awareness
stream by allowing the technology to convey these presence-related signals, without having to
actively attend to feeding this stream later while the stream continues to be delivered by the
technology. And finally, on certain occasions, entirely new streams of awareness might spring up
involuntarily as by-product of the practice one is engaged in during that particular encounter. An
example would be the colleague who enters one’s office (as part of a work practice) while one is
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engaged in a phone conversation with another and thereby conveys certain personal information
to others on the other end of the phone line.
In the same way as signaling, observing can also be active and conscious, in the sense of paying
attention, or be rather latent or peripheral, in the sense of being an implicit part of other
activities. On the one hand one might actively monitor the signals coming from others, as when
one actively observes who is online in the contact list of IM. Hence, one can actively direct
streams provided by others to fill one’s pools of awareness. On the other hand, while observing
the stream of communication related to one particular pool of awareness, one might at the same
time observe information about others that is only peripherally relevant to an overall goal of the
interaction, but is nevertheless added to an awareness pool (i.e., “filed away”). Observing can
thus be rather implicit, almost like noticing the light or noises coming from a colleague’s office
in passing. In this case, awareness pools are filled with relatively little observational effort.
Consequently, we conclude that both signaling and observing can be, but need not be the result
of deliberate user action, rather awareness can arise almost subconsciously as the by-product of
other activities or be a part of general communication (e.g. while one is talking on the phone,
background noise might provide a notion of the other’s physical presence and location).
Proposition 12: Both signaling and observation of awareness information can happen
either actively or as by-product of other practices.
Proposition 12a: Awareness information can be actively provided through
communication or be conveyed as by-product of other practices. In essence, while
some streams are deliberately created and fed, others spring up unintentionally
and/or continue to be delivered by technology.
Proposition 12b: Awareness information can be actively sought by monitoring the
virtual workspace or be perceived in the form of peripheral information while
being engaged in other activities. In essence, interactants can actively direct
streams to fill their pools, while other pools can be filled without effort.
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Discussion
In the preceding sections, we introduced a theory that describes a dynamic notion of awareness
and explains why and how awareness is created via mediated communication. Our theory is
somewhat general in that the pools and streams notion could be applied to all forms of
communication. For example, uncertainty reduction theory (URT) suggests that uncertainty in
face-to-face encounters is particularly salient in “the initial stages of interaction between
strangers” (Berger and Calabrese, 1975, 110), and similar to our notion that pools of awareness
drain over time, URT suggests that “persons who do not have frequent contact with each other
become uncertain about each other” (p. 110). However, we feel that our pools and streams theory
identifies issues about obtaining and maintaining awareness that are uniquely suited to research
and design in mediated contexts, because fundamental awareness needs recur with each
encounter, while these needs are taken for granted in face-to-face encounters. Our framework
builds from the notion that one needs to reduce uncertainty when communicating, but we
emphasize the need to understand which uncertainty needs occur when one uses a new mediated
communication tool, and which uncertainty needs will recur after interaction ceases for a time.
Correspondingly, in our theory, the pools of awareness represent uncertainty needs. In the
following, we will discuss implications of our theory for mediated communication researchers
and then for tool designers in practice.

Implications for Researchers
Most studies in the CSCW and HCI domains have treated awareness as a design problem: tools
need to be built in certain ways in order to enable awareness. Gross and colleagues suggest that
“existing CSCW applications only partially support…awareness“ and that in order “to enrich the
existing CSCW applications with the missing features” empirical research is needed to
constantly identify gaps in awareness support; also, “novel behaviors might be recognized that
lead, in turn, to novel features, and so forth” (Gross et al., 2005, 356). In the information systems
domain, historically, mediated communication research has argued from a similar technology
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determinist position and hence been slow to recognize the role of user practices in influencing
behavior and the usage of technology. For example, early media richness theorists proposed that
mediated communication technologies left users without the feeling of the presence of others
(Short et al., 1976), and were only appropriate for formal and less equivocal tasks (Rice, 1993),
while later research suggested that mediated communication was appropriate and even
encouraged informal communication (Walther, 1995), and was employed by managers for
equivocal communication tasks (Markus, 1994). Similarly, GDSS researchers generally believed
that their tools would be used in specific ways and lead to specific “process gains” in decision
making groups (DeSanctis and Gallupe, 1987); only to later advocate the notion that user
practices in the social setting were a powerful mediating force (DeSanctis and Poole, 1994).
However, a technology determinist position, which expects certain awareness effects as a direct
consequence from applying communication media in context, as well as a design-oriented view,
which treats awareness as the outcome of designing and providing certain feature combinations,
both fail to account for the agency of users and their inventiveness and creativity in creating
awareness from communication and from using tools in unexpected ways. In this respect,
designing sophisticated awareness technology might actually turn out to be too restrictive; such
technologies might not fit the particular context and also the need for awareness in context might
change over time. As Heath et al. state: “…solutions which attempt to specify the width and
focus of awareness a priori are unlikely to support even the most simple forms of collaborative
activity.” (2002, 345)
While researchers have recognized the fundamental needs for presence, identity, and activity
awareness (Haines and Cooper, Forthcoming), when designing tools to support these needs,
however, these researchers assumed that technology tools would provide those needs without
recognizing that users must actively participate in awareness creation. Accepting the technologybased view of awareness without acknowledging user practices could lead to user frustration
when technology “adapts” to the evolution of a group and leaves the group without a previously
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taken for granted tool (Oemig and Gross, 2007), and lead to unexpected effects when the users
do not adopt the tool as part of their communication practices (Haines and Cooper,
Forthcoming).
Against this backdrop, we offer our theory as a means to guide future research on designing and
applying technology to support awareness creation in context. For example, we suggest to further
investigate the potential and use of flexible communication tools that allow and enable multiple
ways of awareness creation instead of trying to build into tools elaborate forms of pre-specified
awareness features. In this context, Information Systems as a discipline can make a substantial
contribution, due to its focus on the interplay between the technical and the social aspects in
organizational contexts. We offer some starting points for future research.
Exploring the context-specificity of awareness pools

Our theory proposes that awareness needs in mediated communication take the form of a
hierarchy of inter-dependent pools that vary across contexts. As a natural first step, researchers
might draw upon our framework in exploring the kinds of awareness needs prevalent in different
organizational contexts. Based on our framework research can then derive specific hypotheses as
to the different pools likely to play a role in a given context, as well as to their position within
the hierarchy. In the following paragraphs we offer as a first starting point additional pools and
prerequisites that are suggested by the results of prior mediated communication research. Many
of these pools were not included in Figures 3 or 4 because they do not appear to be fundamental
to either agreement or task-oriented groups.
We noted earlier that preference is awareness of what the others in the shared space want, and
appears to fill after identity (i.e., if there is a need to know others’ preferences, one will first wish
to differentiate among different people in the shared space) (Haines et al., 2006, McLeod, 2000).
Availability is awareness of when a particular person will be available to accomplish a task or
engage in interaction, and appears to fill after activity and identity (i.e., if there is a need to know
others’ availability, one will first wish to differentiate among people and be able to predict what
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activities will occur) (Steinfield et al., 1999). Similarity/Depth is awareness of the values of
others and appears to fill after identity (i.e., before one will desire information about the values
of others, one will wish to differentiate among others in the shared space) (Lea et al., 2001,
Walther, 1995). Influence is an awareness of the salience of another’s preference, which appears
to fill after preference and similarity/depth (i.e., if there is a need to know whether one should be
influenced by others’ preferences, one will wish to differentiate among different people and also
to be able to determine whether those others share similar values or are opinion leaders)
(Sassenberg and Postmes, 2002).
More pools and prerequisites are suggested by looking more broadly at the group process and
performance research. Location is an awareness of where an activity is occurring or will occur
and appears to fill after activity (i.e., if one needs to know where particular activities will occur,
one will first wish to know what activities might occur) (cf., Gutwin and Greenberg, 2002).
Purpose is an awareness of the reason for an activity and appears to fill after activity (i.e., if one
needs to know why an activity is occurring, one will wish to know what activities are occurring
or might occur) (cf., Gutwin and Greenberg, 2002). Skill is awareness of another’s ability to
perform an activity, and appears to fill after identity and activity (i.e., before one will desire to
know the skills of others, one will wish to know the identities of those in the shared space and
the activities to be performed) (Goffman, 1961). Role is an awareness of another’s expected
performance of an activity and appears to also fill after identity and activity (Goffman, 1961).
Cognitive trust is an awareness that another can or cannot be relied upon to complete a particular
task, and appears to fill after knowing another’s skills and their reliability (McAllister, 1995).
Direction is an awareness of the direction/context that the group is working in (i.e., what goals is
the group moving toward), which arises after knowing the location and purpose of activities
(Parks and Sanna, 1999, Steiner, 1972). Affective Trust is an awareness that another is caring and
emotionally trustworthy (McAllister, 1995), which arises after knowing another’s role and their
affiliation. Responsibility is an awareness of which person bears the responsibility for performing
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a specific activity and arises after knowing another’s role and purpose for a particular activity.
Coordination is an awareness of the location where a particular activity will be performed, the
skill of the person who is performing it, and the relationship with other activities in the work
environment.
To illustrate the applicability of our theory with regard to awareness needs, we offer some
testable hypotheses based on the pools introduced before. (1) Roles take longer to develop in
virtual teams when team members communicate less information about their presence, activity,
and identity (Sarker and Sahay, 2003). (2) Trust takes longer to develop in virtual teams if team
members communicate less information about their presence, skills, and reliability (Jarvenpaa
and Leidner, 1999). (3) Group influence is higher via anonymous CMC if more information
about identity, preference, and affiliation are communicated (Haines et al., 2006, Postmes et al.,
1998, Spears and Lea, 1992). (4) Free riding in a GDSS brainstorming context is increased as
presence and activity are communicated, and decreased as role and identity are communicated
(Connolly et al., 1990). (5) Evaluation apprehension via CMC is increased as identity and
affiliation are increased (Dubrovsky et al., 1991, Weisband, 1994). (5) Self-disclosure in on-line
contexts is increased if awareness of others’ presence is reduced (i.e., low public self awareness),
and if awareness of one’s own activities are increased (i.e., high private self-awareness) (Joinson,
2001).
Exploring the dynamic nature of awareness over time

While awareness researchers have begun to recognize the evolving nature of awareness needs
over time (Oemig and Gross, 2007), the dynamic notion of awareness as proposed in our theory
remains largely under-researched so far. Future research should explore how awareness needs
shift over time in order to further our understanding of the flexible role of technologies in
awareness creation and the corresponding user processes of adaptation and appropriation. In
doing so, our framework accounts for the evolution of awareness needs and the ability of users to
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direct technology to fulfill those needs. In essence, we recognize that communication technology
is the tool that carries the streams that users direct toward different pools of awareness.
More specifically, researchers might turn not only to identifying the different needs over time,
i.e. the changing of the pool hierarchy, but also to exploring the extent to which certain pools in
the hierarchy have to be filled in specific encounters of a social group. Our theory proposes that
awareness develops gradually from very basic notions, e.g. the mere being-there of others, to
very elaborate understanding of aspects of others, e.g. their physical, bodily presence. While our
theory captures this understanding, we still know little about the depth of certain pools as well as
their different stages of filling in a concrete context or how these might be conceptualized (e.g.
can we identify scales that describes the filling of certain pools?). A typical research questions in
context might be: How much filling of which types of pools do people need, in a given context,
to be able to work effectively?
Exploring the practices of awareness creation

So far, we have arrived at an appreciation for the necessity to view awareness as resulting from
practice and at a conceptualization of the mechanisms of awareness creation, as manifested in
our stream-related propositions above. However, more research is needed to better understand
the proliferation of shared practices in social contexts. In doing so, future research should also
aim at understanding why some tools appear to be better than others at facilitating or enabling
practices of awareness creation (Riemer et al., 2007).
In our theory we have elaborated on the fundamental mechanisms that breed awareness, i.e. the
signaling and observing as the two main activities of awareness practices. Future research should
aim at contextualizing these mechanisms in that it explores the nature of concrete practices and
the nature of observing and signaling in given organizational contexts. For example: Is signaling
more conscious/active or a peripheral part of other practices? What technologies are drawn upon
to carry the streams of signaling information? What role do tools play in feeding certain streams
automatically, without user involvement? Is signaling done in a more bilateral, idiosyncratic
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manner, or does it happen on a group-level? Are people aware of the draining of pools and do
they adapt their practices accordingly?
As for suitable research methods, rich methods for data collection are needed to appreciate and
grasp existing social practices and their complexity and embeddedness in organizational
contexts. Obviously, ethnographic studies and workplace observations are very well suited to
gain an understanding of how people draw on and use ICT in their practices of distributed work
and awareness creation (Riemer et al., 2007). As for the exploration of the micro-structure of
awareness creation activities, i.e. the signaling and observing of awareness creation through
communication, experimental setups might be best able to control for group-level and
technology-level influence factors on the proliferation of such practices .

Implications for Tool Designers
The simplest advice to practitioners derived from our framework is that technology tools should
be designed to support users in filling the highest-level pools first: presence, identity, and
activity. Other awareness researchers offer similar advice (Gross et al., 2005, Gutwin and
Greenberg, 2002, Jang et al., 2000); however, using the streams and pools metaphor, we offer a
sense of why those elements of awareness are so critical: by turning the stream to presence,
identity, and activity (in some cases before any other interaction occurs), these tool designs allow
users to immediately focus their interaction stream on other aspects of awareness. These
“downstream” aspects of awareness are more context-specific and may likewise be more critical
for the groups in getting organized and accomplishing their specific tasks (Haines and Scamell,
2003). As interaction proceeds, the more fundamental aspects of awareness may be taken for
granted, meaning that technology that provides this awareness may be ignored. However, we
have noted that these fundamental awareness needs are likely to recur quickly if interaction
ceases.
Other work in context-based awareness technology has similarly recognized that awareness
needs of interactants change over time. For example, it has been noted that when instant
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messaging, one typically needs online status (i.e., presence) information about another only
before a conversation is initiated: presence can be taken for granted as the interaction proceeds
(Oemig and Gross, 2007). Similarly, the process of group development suggests that different
aspects of awareness will be important in groups as they continue to work together over a longer
period of time (Oemig and Gross, 2007, Sarker and Sahay, 2003). However, while our pools and
streams framework allows for the continuous evolution of information needs, we again note the
potential for information needs to devolve as the pools drain. In essence, a particular technology
tool may be perceived of as useful before interaction begins, later to become disused, and finally
to return to usefulness as the awareness needs of the interactants evolve. Potential reasons for
awareness needs to change (i.e., evolve or devolve) include: group development over time
(Haines and Scamell, 2003, Oemig and Gross, 2007), changes in existing member location
(Riemer et al., 2007), new or leaving group members (Jarvenpaa et al., 1998, Sarker and Sahay,
2003), and changes in user practices with respect to the technology (Riemer et al., 2007). Thus,
we believe that tool designers and researchers must recognize the potential for awareness needs
to evolve, but should explicitly account for a user’s desire to direct the interaction stream among
awareness pools according to their needs and their perceptions of the needs of others.

Conclusions
In summary, we conceive of awareness in mediated communication as building in pools that are
fed by directing streams of interaction. The interaction streams emerge from the actions of those
involved in the interaction; specifically, we propose that interaction via mediated communication
is directed by the interactants according to their need to fill various pools of awareness. By
introducing this notion of awareness and by providing our framework and a set of propositions
we hope to propose a useful theory of awareness creation that builds upon a dynamic notion of
awareness creation and in doing so acknowledges the active role of the user (i.e. human agency)
and the role of social practice in meeting awareness needs. With our work we contribute to
ongoing research on computer-mediated communication and awareness in distributed work; we
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argue that in order to advance our knowledge in this domain we are in need of a distinct
Information Systems perspective, which treats awareness creation as social practice and moves
beyond a mere technology view.
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